It is time for the outside world to start setting up buffer zones in Syria

Syria under Assad 

Horror in Houla 

It is time for the outside world to start setting up buffer zones in Syria

THE slaughter of at least 100 civilians, most of them women and children, in Houla on May 25th has changed the dynamic of the Syrian saga. The world, including Arabs and Turks, is outraged. Even Russia and China thought it wise to endorse a declaration in the UN Security Council expressing horror, though Russia still managed to pretend that no one knew who the culprits were. Cries of “Something must be done” have become louder. But what?
One option—preferred by such as Russia and China—is to leave the place to stew in its own juice. President Bashar Assad, whose soldiers and associated militias plainly perpetrated the Houla atrocity, would presumably increase the level of brutality against his disaffected compatriots. The uprising might simmer down or boil up until it ousted Mr Assad; either way, many thousands of people would probably be killed before the outcome was clear. That course of action has nothing to recommend it, except to governments which, lacking democratic legitimacy themselves, are unwilling to undermine others in the same position.
A second course is to give more time to a plan presented by Kofi Annan, a former secretary-general of the UN, backed by the Arab League and the UN. Under this, Mr Assad and the armed rebels are supposed to cease fire. Government troops and their heavy armour should withdraw from towns to let 300 UN monitors oversee the peace. And negotiations are meant to set Syria on a path to multi-party democracy. Mainly thanks to Mr Assad’s intransigence, none of these conditions is being properly met. Even so, Mr Annan’s three-month mandate is likely to be extended when it ends in July. If the monitors, of whom there are nearly 300, could be boosted to, say, 5,000, they might do some good. If the Russians could be persuaded that it is in their long-term interest to dump Mr Assad, as indeed it is, perhaps they could nudge him into abiding by Mr Annan’s plan. But as things stand, the diplomacy is futile.
The third way, and the one most people think realistic, is to tighten the noose on the regime with sanctions, by boosting and co-ordinating the opposition both within and outside Syria, by giving non-lethal help to the rebels, and by turning a blind eye to the flow of arms and cash from the Gulf and elsewhere. Mr Assad’s regime may run out of cash, or even grain. His armed forces, especially those who are not members of his dominant Alawite minority, may gradually turn against him, as may the merchants. The balance of power will shift and Mr Assad will go. The snag with this is that it could take a very long time. Sectarian mayhem may deepen and persist bloodily, as it did next door in Lebanon for 15 ghastly years between 1975 and 1990, before a new order was established.
Time to take a risk?
The fourth option is to impose buffer zones and humanitarian corridors on Syria’s borders, starting with the Turkish one. This would both provide sanctuary to Syrian civilians fleeing attacks from Mr Assad’s forces and give the Free Syrian Army a place to retreat to in order to regroup.
Such a plan would be fraught with danger. Mr Assad would almost certainly attack such zones unless he were convinced that his own air defences and armour would be bombed. NATO governments would therefore have to be prepared to go into action to protect them, and Turkey and the Arab League would have to support them. None of those governments is yet prepared to up the ante to that degree.
They should. Buffer zones would require more of the West and of Syria’s neighbours than the other options. But they may be necessary to avert a long civil war.