More Desireable but impossible: Nuclear-Free Middle
East
A number of discussion in the West, supports
the idea of a nuclear-free zone for
the Middle East. Such thinking is at rest treated as politically marginal, and
hardly capable of being heard above the deafening beat of the war drums. To the
extent proposed, it also tends to be defensively and sensibly phrased to
reinforce the existing anti-Iran consensus.
For example, in a recent New
York Times article by Shibley Telhami and Steven Kull a full discovery
title gives the plot away: "Preventing
a Nuclear Iran". The authors offer us a prudential dispute against
attacking Iran to avoid a damaging Iranian retaliation and in view of the
inability of an attack to do more than delay Iran's nuclear programme by a few years. Beyond this, an attack
seems likely to create appealing pressures in Iran to do everything possible to
obtain a nuclear option with a changed sense of urgency, as well as to disrupt
Western interests wherever possible.
This Telhami/Kull position is reinforced by
evidence that Israeli society is not
as war-prone as claimed, and would be receptive to a more careful and less
aggressive approach. They refer readers to a recent Israeli poll finding that
only 43 per cent of Israelis favor a military strike, while 64 per cent support
establishing a nuclear-free zone (NFZ) in the region that included Israel.
In effect, then, establishing a NFZ that
includes Israel would seem politically possible, although not a course of
action that seems within the range of options being measured by the current
Israeli political leadership.
The failure of the United States to raise the possibility of a solution to the
conflict other than either an Iranian
surrender with respect to its enhancement rights or an impending military
attack is also discouraging. The silence of Washington with respect to a peaceful
regional solution to the conflict with Iran confirms what is extensively
believed around the world - that the US Government will not deviate from the
official Israeli line on security issues in the Middle East.
The fact that the Israeli public may be more
peace-oriented than its elected leaders seems to make no difference to
strategic thinking in the US, and what is more, the realisation that the
exercise of the military option would have a likely huge negative impact on
national and global interest is also put to one side.
Prince Turki's proposals
Another variant of NFZ thinking is more
oriented to the realities of the Middle East. It has most clearly formulated by
the influential Saudi Prince, Turki Al-Faisal, former Saudi ambassador to the
United States and once the head of his country's intelligence service. He
argues that NFZ is preferable to the military option for many reasons, and he
believes, in contrast to President Obama, that it should be removed from the
bag of tricks at the disposal of diplomats.
Prince Turki believes that sanctions have
not, and will not alter Iran's behaviour. His proposal is more elaborate than
simply advocating a NFZ. He would be in favour of coercive steps against Iran
if there is ever convincing evidence that it actually possesses nuclear
weapons, but he also argues for the imposition of sanction on Israel if it
fails to disclose openly the full extent of its nuclear weapons arsenal.
Prince Turki's approach has several
additional features: extending the scope of the undertaking to all weapons of
mass destruction (WMD), that is, including biological and chemical weapons; a
nuclear security umbrella for the region maintained by the five permanent
members of the UN Security Council; a resolution of outstanding conflicts in
the region in accordance with the Mecca Arab proposals of 2002 that calls for
Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian territories and the Golan Heights occupied
in 1967, as well as the political and commercial normalisation of relations
between Israel and the Arab world.
Prince Turki warns that if some such
arrangement is not soon put in place, and Iran proceeds with its nuclear
programme, other countries in the region, including Turkey, will almost
certainly be drawn into an expensive and destabilising nuclear arms race.
In effect, as with Telhami/Kull, Prince
Turki's approach is designed to make sure that worst case scenarios do not
happen. It is more contextually framed to encompass several larger challenges
in the Middle East, rather than confining its rationale to addressing the
Israel/Iran confrontation.
The Turki proposals have some exigent
aspects, including the idea that governments in the region could be expected to
rely on the five permanent members of the Security Council to co-operate
effectively if faced with a challenge to the NFZ. From another perspective, the
proposal might be questioned as a historically insensitive effort to allot
authority over future security issues in the region to former colonial powers.
NFZ or WMDFZ without
Israel
There is another baffling feature of Prince
Turki's vision of a peaceful future for the Middle East. He urges the adoption
of such a collective commitment to the elimination of WMD in the region with or
without Israeli support at a consultation of parties to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty scheduled for later this year in Finland, which seems
to play into the hands of Western hawks.
Israel is not even a party to the NPT, has so
far not indicated its willingness to attend the conference, and if
participating, would likely play an disruptive role. What is the point of a NFZ
or WMDFZ without Israel? As long ago as the 1995 NPT Review Conference, the
Arab countries put forward a proposal to institute in the Middle East a
WMD-free zone, but it has never been consequently invoked.
Israel, which is not a member of the NPT, has
time and again taken the position over the years that only after peace prevails
throughout the region, will it consider lending support to a legal regime, keeping
out the possession of nuclear weapons.
The NFZ or WMDFZ initiatives need to be seen
in the setting established by the NPT regime. An initial observation involves
Israel's failure to become a party to the NPT coupled with its covert nuclear
programme that resulted in the acquisition of the weaponry more than 20 years
ago with the complicity of the West as documented in Seymour Hersh's 1991 The
Samson Option.
This Israeli pattern of behaviour needs to be
contrasted with that of Iran, a party to the NPT that has reported to and
accepted, although with some friction in recent years, international
inspections on its territory by the Western oriented International Atomic
Energy Agency. Iran has always denied any ambition to acquire nuclear weapons,
but has insisted on its rights under Article IV of the treaty to exercise "… its inalienable right… to develop
research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
discrimination..."
Iran has been under constant threat of an
attack by Israel. It has also been the target for several years of Israel's
extremely dirty low intensity war, as well as being the subject of a US
Congressionally funded destabilisation programme of the US that is reinforced
by a diplomacy that constantly reaffirms the relevance of a military option,
and operates in a political climate that excludes consideration of Israel's
nuclear arsenal.
What is surprising under these circumstances
is that Iran has not freed itself from NPT obligation as it is entitled to do.
All parties to the NPT have a treaty right to withdraw set forth in Article X
requiring only that a withdrawing state give notice to other treaty parties and
provide an explanation of its reasons for withdrawing.
Geopolitical
priorities
Comparing these Israeli and Iran patterns of behavior
with respect to nuclear weapons, it would seem far more reasonable to conclude
that it is Israel, not Iran, that should be subjected to sanctions, and put under
pressure to participate in denuclearizing negotiations. After all, Israel
acquired the weaponry secretly and defiantly, has not been even willing to
accept the near universally applicable discipline of the NPT, and has engaged
periodically in aggressive wars against its neighbors that have resulted in
several long-term occupations.
It can be argued that Israel was entitled to
enhance its security by remaining outside the NPT, and thus is acting within
its sovereign rights. This is a coherent legalistic position, but we should
also appreciate that the NPT is more a geopolitical
than a legal regime,
and that Iran, for instance, would be immediately subject to a punitive
response if it tried to withdraw from the treaty. In other words, geopolitical
priorities override legal rights in the NPT setting.
The history of the NPT has reflected its
geopolitical nature. This is best illustrated by the utter refusal of the
nuclear weapons states, above all the US, to fulfill its core obligation under
Article VI "to pursue negotiations
in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear
arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control."
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in
its 1996 Advisory Opinion on The Legality of Nuclear Weapons
unanimously affirmed in its findings the legal imperative embodied in Article
VI: "There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and
complete disarmament in all its aspects under strict international
control."
This finding that has been completely ignored
by the nuclear weapons states (who had made full use of their diplomatic
leverage in a failed effort to encourage members of the UN General Assembly not
to seek guidance from the ICJ with respect to the legal status of nuclear
weapons and the obligations of the NPT). The refusal to uphold these obligations
of Article VI would certainly appear to be a material breach of the treaty that
under international law authorizes any party to regard the treaty as void.
Again, the international discourse on nuclear
weapons is so distorted that it is a rarity to encounter criticism of its
discriminatory application, its double standards as between nuclear and
non-nuclear states, and its geopolitical style of discriminating enforcement.
In this regard, it should be appreciated that the threat of military attack
directed at Iran resembles reliance on the so-called Bush Doctrine of
preventive war that had been used to justify aggression against Iraq in 2003,
and represents a blatant geopolitical override of international law.
Need to avoid war
In summary, it is of utmost importance to
avoid a war in the Middle East arising from the unresolved dispute about Iran's
nuclear programmed. One way to do this is to seek a NFZ or a WMDFZ for the
entire region that must include the participation of Israel. What has given
this approach a renewed credibility for the West at this time is that such a
measure seems to be the only way to prevent a lose/lose war option from materializing
in an atmosphere where mainstream pundits are increasingly predicting an attack
on Iran during 2012.
A NFZ plan has some prudential appeal to
change minds in Tehran and Tel Aviv before it is too late, and could also
encourage Washington to take a less destructive and self-destructive course of
action. Whether this prudential appeal is sufficiently strong to overcome the
iron cage of militarism that constrains policy choices in Israel and the US
remains doubtful.
Thinking outside the militarist box remains a
forbidden activity, partly reflecting the domestic lock on the political and
moral imagination of these countries by their respective military industrial
media think-tank complexes.
I would conclude this commentary with three
pessimistic assessments that casts a dark shadow over the regional future:
(1) an NFZ or WMDFZ for the Middle East is
necessary and desirable, but it almost certainly will not be placed on the
political agenda of American-led diplomacy relating to the conflict;
(2) moves toward nuclear disarmament
negotiations that have been legally mandated and would be beneficial for the
world, and for the nuclear weapons states and their peoples, will not be made
in the current atmosphere that blocks all serious initiatives to abolish
nuclear weapons;
(3) the drift toward a devastating attack on
Iran will only be stopped by an urgent mobilisation of anti-war forces in civil
society, which seems unlikely given other preoccupations.
To overcome such pessimism requires a broader
vision of peace and justice that is even broader than the relative approach
taken by Prince Turki. It would centre on demilitarisation of the region
through disarmament, as well as a firm regional commitment to avoid entangling
alliances with external actors, meaning no military deployments or bases in the
region. With drones engaging in lethal missions in the Middle East and an array
of American military bases, this seems like a utopian fantasy, and maybe it is.
But maybe also we have reached a ironic stage
in the region, and possibly the world, where only the utopian imagination can
offer us a realistic vision of a hopeful human future.
